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Abstract
Understanding of other’s actions as goal-directed is considered a fundamental ability underlying cognitive and social
development in human infants. A number of studies using the habituation-dishabituation paradigm have shown that the
ability to discern intentional relations, in terms of goal-directedness of an action towards an object, appears around 5
months of age. The question of whether non-human species can perceive other’s actions as goal-directed has been more
controversial, however there is mounting evidence that at least some primates species do. Recently domestic dogs have
been shown to be particularly sensitive to human communicative cues and more so in cooperative and intentional contexts.
Furthermore, they have been shown to imitate selectively. Taken together these results suggest that dogs may perceive
others’ actions as goal-directed, however no study has investigated this issue directly. In the current study, adopting an
infant habituation-dishabituation paradigm, we investigated whether dogs attribute intentions to an animate (a human) but
not an inanimate (a black box) agent interacting with an object. Following an habituation phase in which the agent
interacted always with one of two objects, two sets of 3 trials were presented: new side trials (in which the agent interacted
with the same object as in the habituation trial but placed in a novel location) and new goal trials (in which the agent
interacted with the other object placed in the old location). Dogs showed a similar pattern of response to that shown in
infants, looking longer in the new goal than new side trials when they saw the human agent interact with the object. No
such difference emerging with the inanimate agent (the black box). Results provide the first evidence that a non-primate
species can perceive another individual’s actions as goal-directed. We discuss results in terms of the prevailing mentalisitic
and non-mentalistic hypotheses regarding goal-attribution.
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Introduction
Intention attribution is considered a fundamental ability
underlying much of cognitive, social and linguistic development
in human infants and much debate has revolved around when
infants start viewing other’s actions as intentional [1,2]. The
emergence of a fully-fledged mentalistic understanding in children
appears to occur around the age of 4 years, with the understanding
of false-belief [3,4] however, understanding of actions as goal-
directed has been considered a necessary precondition for
understanding intentional actions (and attributing mental states)
and a number of studies have shown the emergence of this ability
before the end of the first year [5,6,7].
Indeed in a seminal work using an habituation-dishabituation
paradigm, Woodward found that when 5-month old infants
repeatedly observe a person interacting with an object, they will
then look longer when the actor suddenly switches to interacting
with a different item in the same location than when they see the
actor interacting with the usual object placed in a new location. The
‘surprise’ shown by infants in this paradigm has lead authors to
conclude that infants understand the actor’s action as being goal-
directed to a particular target [7,8]. Further studies using a similar
paradigm have shown that infants attribute goal-directedness to
animate but not inanimate agents [7,9] (although inanimate agents
can also ‘have goals’ if they exhibit certain features [10,11]) and to
deliberate but not accidental actions towards an object [12,13].
Overall, these findings suggest that infants represent actions as
organized by the relation between agent and object: however,
there is currently a lively debate around the question as to whether
infant’s ability to understand such a relation is based on their
interpretation of the mental connections between the agent and
the object (e.g. the actor ‘wants/prefers’ that particular target) [13]
or whether results can be equally thoroughly explained by a more
functional interpretation where goals are defined as the perceiv-
able outcomes (or targets) of specific actions and inferential
reasoning about the relationship between the elements is sufficient
to allow infants to ‘solve’ such apparently mentalistic questions
[14].
Attribution of intentions in non-human animals has been even
more controversial to establish [15], but gathering evidence in the
past 15 years suggests that non-human primates may discern goal-
directed actions in certain contexts. For example, both chimpan-
zees and capuchin monkeys distinguish between a person who is
unable vs. unwilling to give out food, and the latter have been
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shown to do so only with animate but not inanimate agents
[16,17]. Using a looking time paradigm similar to Woodward’s
method with infants, it was found that rhesus macaques expect
people to reach towards an object they have been oriented to,
suggesting that they use head orientation to predict action [18]
and marmosets attribute goal-directed action to conspecifics and
humans, less to a marmoset-like robot, and not at all to an
inanimate black box [19,20]. Furthermore, as with human infants
[21,22] attribution of goal-directed behaviour in macaques may be
mediated by one’s own experience of the world, since familiar (but
not unfamiliar) actions observed being performed by a human are
interpreted as goal-directed [23]. Finally, chimpanzees, similarly to
infants [24] have been found to complete unfulfilled goals, rather
than reproduce what the experimenter was attempting (but failing)
to achieve [25,26] and imitate rationally—that is, they skip certain
actions that the experimenter produced due to her physical
constraints [27].
In the current study, we adapted the method used by
Woodward and colleagues [7,9] to start investigating the
perception of (human) goal-directed action in dogs. Dogs have
been considered by a number of researchers as a potentially
interesting case because of their approximately 30.000 years of
association with humans [28,29], which may have resulted,
through a process of ‘convergent evolution’, in more ‘human-like’
socio-cognitive skills in dogs [30–33].
As regards dogs’ potential understanding of human intentions,
research so far shows that dogs can distinguish friendly vs.
threatening behaviours enacted by both familiar and unfamiliar
humans, and respond differently depending on whether they are
exhibited in a playful or ‘serious’ context [34]. Furthermore, they
follow pointing gestures more in collaborative than competitive
situations [35] and appear to appreciate the referential nature of
the pointing gesture [36,37]. Moreover, in a recent study dogs
were shown to preferentially follow intentional pointing accom-
panied by ostensive communicative cues (e.g. gaze alternation)
compared to morphologically similar but unintentional ones (e.g.
pointing whilst alternating gaze from wall to wrist watch) [38].
Hence, it seems that dogs may be viewing human pointing as a
goal-directed act, although no study has directly addressed this
issue and results contrast with an earlier study in which it was
shown that although dogs can use a marker to locate food in an
object-choice task, they do not differentiate between an intentional
vs. accidental placing of the marker on the object [39]. Finally,
similarly to studies with infants, dogs have been shown to imitate
selectively in that they will reproduce specific actions taking into
account the constraints of the model, suggesting they are sensitive
to the efficiency of goal-directed actions [40] but see also [41,42].
Taken together results from these studies are inconclusive,
although some at least seem to suggest that dogs may recognize
when a human or a conspecific’s action directed towards an object
is goal directed.
Interestingly, most of the studies investigating dogs’ understand-
ing of an actor’s intentions have been set in a communicative
context (e.g., object-choice tasks in which an actor shows the dog
where the food is hidden) [38,39], whereas this has not been the
case for neither infants nor primates [43]. Hence in the current
study we adopted Woodward’s and colleagues looking time
habituation-dishabituation paradigm to investigate dogs’ under-
standing of human object-directed actions, with no communicative
cues being displayed towards the subject. The overall aims of the
study were to assess whether: i) Woodward’s habituation-
dishabituation experimental paradigm could be used with dogs
and whether ii) results with dogs could be comparable to those
with infants, in showing attribution of goal-directed actions to an
animate (a human) but not an inanimate (a black box) agent
interacting with an object.
Hence, we presented dogs with either a black box or an
unfamiliar individual interacting repeatedly with one of two
distinct objects (a globe vs. a watering-can). As in paradigms with
infants, once dogs had habituated to the scene (habituation phase),
the position of the objects was switched (test phase). Dogs were
then given three trials in which they saw the agent (animate or
inanimate) interact with the usual object (in the new location),
followed by three trials in which the agent interacted with the new
object (in the familiar location) in a counterbalanced order across
subjects. In infant studies, following the habituation phase, results
showed that whereas there was a significantly higher looking time
in the new object compared to the new location trials when an
animate agent (i.e. a human hand) grasped for the object, no such
effect was discernable when an inanimate agent (e.g. mechanical
claws, rods etc.) carried out the same behaviour [7,9].
Similarly if dogs, perceive the actions of the animate agent as
goal-directed, we expect a significantly higher looking time when
they see the person (animate agent) interact with the novel object
compared to the usual one (in the new place) but this pattern of
results should not however occur with the inanimate object (i.e. the
black box).
Method
Ethics statement
No special permission is required for use of animals (dogs) in
such behavioural studies in Italy. The relevant ethical committee is
the Ethical Committee of the Universita` degli Studi di Milano.
Dog owners were briefed as to what would happen during the test
and gave consent before the test could commence.
Subjects
Fifty-two dog-owner dyads were recruited based on the Canis
sapiens Lab (University of Milan) database. The dog sample
consisted of 22 males and 30 females whose ages ranged from 1 to
10 years (mean = 5.9 years, SD = 2.6). 31 subjects were pure-breed
and 21 mixed-breed (see Appendix 1 for breed of dogs). All the
dogs were kept for companionship, lived within the human
household and had either no or only basic training experience.
Most dogs had participated in other studies by our group, but not
studies using the experimental paradigm adopted here. Dogs were
randomly assigned to one of two groups: Animate, Inanimate.
Material
Two objects (a watering can and a globe) were used, following a
preliminary test in which a different sample of 7 dogs showed no
preference for either of them, neither in terms of first choice
(binomial p = 0.4) nor interaction time (t = 2, p = 0.09).
Procedure. Dogs were briefly allowed to explore the testing
room, whilst the owner was briefed regarding procedure. Then the
owner sat in a chair, positioned 30 cm behind the dog. The dog
wore a short leash (60 cm) attached to their collar/harness, and
the leash was fixed to a hook in the wall. Owners were asked not to
interact with the dogs throughout the test, and to allow them to sit
or lie down as they wished. A video camera was placed directly in
front of the dog (2 m away) so as to capture the dog’s looking
behaviour (but not the agent’s actions). On either side (at equal
distances) of the videocamera two objects, a globe and a watering
can, were placed on the ground 110 cm apart. A door (from which
the experimenter entered during trials) was located 120 cm behind
the videocamera.
Dogs’ Understanding of Human Goal-Directed Action
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Two people were involved in testing: the experimenter and the
observer. The experimenter acted out the required scene (in the
Animate group) and controlled the black box from behind the
curtain (in the Inanimate group). The observer coded the dog’s
behaviour from a computer located in an adjacent room and
linked to the videocamera in the testing room.
Prior to the start of each trial the experimenter briefly knocked
on the door to attract the dog’s attention (if dogs habituated to this
and stopped responding, a hand-clap was used as an alternative).
Habituation Phase. In the habituation phase dogs in the
Animate group then saw the experimenter (a female) entering the
room, approaching, crouching down and interacting with one of
the objects by touching it repeatedly and looking at it intently. The
duration of the trial (i.e. the time the experimenter spent
interacting with the object) was dependent on the dog’s looking
behaviour, in that it lasted until dogs looked away for more than 2
seconds or for a maximum trial length of 12 seconds. On hearing
the predetermined signal from the observer (see below), the
experimenter got up and without looking at the dog left the room.
After a brief pause (5 seconds) the experimenter knocked on the
door again to attract the dog’s attention and start the subsequent
trial.
In the Inanimate group the door was left open, but a curtain
was placed in front of it. A black box (w 18 cm, h 37 cm, d 23 cm)
was placed centrally, in front of the curtain, and was manipulated
by the experimenter (sitting behind the curtain) using a long
(68 cm) stick attached to it. During the habituation phase, after
drawing the dog’s attention by knocking on a board behind the
curtain, the experimenter pushed the black box towards one of the
objects and continued moving it so that it repeatedly bumped into
the object, from different angles, following the same trajectory
used by the animate agent. Dogs could see neither the
experimenter nor her hands manipulating the stick. The duration
of the trial was dependent on the dog’s looking behaviour, and
lasted until dogs looked away for more than 2 seconds or for a
maximum of 12 seconds. On hearing the predetermined signal,
the experimenter pulled the box back to the central location in
front of the curtain and after a brief pause (5 seconds), knocked
again to start the subsequent trial.
The observer coded the dogs’ looking behaviour (for both
groups) by watching the dog on a computer monitor (in the
adjacent room) linked to the video-camera in the testing room.
The coder pressed a key on a computer keyboard when the dog
looked towards the object the experimenter was interacting with.
A computer program calculated looking times and habituation
criteria from this input (Habit 1.0, University of Texas). The
observer was unaware of the order of test trials assigned to the dog
(i.e. whether it was new side followed by new goal or viceversa),
however she was aware of group (Animate vs. Inanimate) and
when the habituation ended and the test trials began. Unfortu-
nately, the observer reported it was easy to ‘guess’ where the
experimenter was located in the room by the dogs’ looking
behaviour, hence ‘live’ coding could not be considered blind (see
later ‘analyses’ section for coder-reliability to counter this
problem).
The dogs’ looking was timed starting when the actor’s hand (or
the black box) made contact with the object and continuing until
the dog had looked away from the person/box for 2 s or until 12 s
had elapsed. Thus, looking was timed as the dog saw the agent
interacting with the objects. To let the observer know when to start
coding the experimenter signalled by emitting a ‘beep’ from a
stopwatch when she (or the black box) started touching the object.
Similarly, the observer activated the stopwatch with a beeping
sound to signal to the experimenter when to end the test (i.e. after
the dogs had looked away for more than 2 s or after 12 s).
For half of the dogs, the object on the right was the target of the
agent’s interaction, for the other half the object on the left was.
Since side placement of the globe and watering-can was
counterbalanced, there were four possible habituation events for
each group. At least 6 dogs in each group were habituated to each
of the four events. Males and females were distributed approxi-
mately evenly across habituation events.
The habituation criterion was computed for each dog. A dog
reached habituation criterion after three consecutive trials in
which the duration of its looking time behaviour towards the event
totalled to less than half of the sum of the three consecutive trials
with the longest exhibited looking time (e.g. if the longest duration
of looking time exhibited by the dog in three consecutive trials
were respectively 10, 9, 11 seconds, habituation would be reached
by this dog when the sum of the looking time duration in three
consecutive trials occurring after the above, was less than 15
seconds i.e. (10+9+11)/2). Hence each dog had a minimum of six
trials in the habituation phase (if the sum of the looking duration in
the last three consecutive trials was less than half the sum of the
looking duration in the first three trials). Once a subject had
reached the habituation criterion an extra habituation trial was
presented to obtain a measure of the dog’s looking time following
habituation. A predetermined maximum of 14 habituation trials
was set, after which dogs were presented with test trials whether
they had habituated or not [7]. The length and number of
habituation trials presented was therefore subject-determined,
although a maximum number of trials was set (see [44] for the
necessity of subject-determined habituation and a discussion of
methodology).
Test Phase. After the habituation trials, the owner was asked
to leave the room with the dog for approximately 1 minute.
During this exit the researcher swapped the position of the objects.
The dog and owner re-entered the room and took up their usual
position. Following the same procedure used with infants [7] the
dog was then given one familiarization trial (lasting 12 seconds
max or after the dog looked away for more than 2 seconds, as
above) with the objects in their new positions but no actor present,
so that any increased looking time in test trials could not be due
simply to the new disposition of the objects. The dog then saw
three consecutive new-goal test trials followed by three consecutive
new-side test trials. On new-goal events the agent approached the
same side as during habituation trials, but this time interacting
with the other object. On new-side events the actor approached
and interacted with the same object as in habituation trials, which
was now placed on the other side of the room (Figure 1). The
order of the test events (three new-goal followed by three new-side
first) was counterbalanced across dogs in all groups.
Analyses
Since the observer during ‘live’ coding reported that it was in
most cases easy to guess the order of test trials by the dog’s
direction of looking behaviour, 4 months after the test was
conducted, the same observer re-coded all trials (habituation and
test phase) a second time from video (using the Habit program).
However, to obtain a coding that was blind to test order trials, this
time the observer coded the test trials first (hence without knowing
what the prior habituation event had been) and the habituation
trials last. Intra-observer reliability on the entire dataset between
‘live’ coding and second coding was found to be excellent
(Cronbach’s alpha = 0.88). However, a few discrepancies occurred
with three dogs who had seemingly habituated after fewer than 14
trials during live coding, who were in fact found not to have done
Dogs’ Understanding of Human Goal-Directed Action
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so on second coding (they were hence eliminated from the subject
pool for analyses, see below). Data from the second coding was
used for statistical analyses since it was thought to be more
accurate, having been collected without at the same time the
necessity of communicating with the actor during trials and with
less of a potential bias due to ‘guessing’ the test order.
Furthermore, a second observer (SMP), completely blind to trial
order and habituation condition, coded 50% of test trials
randomly selected across groups. Inter-observer reliability done
between the second coding of MC and SMP was good
(Cronbach’s alpha = 0.82). Finally, an observer unrelated to the
study, who had no knowledge of the hypothesis being tested coded
the dogs’ looking behaviour in a semi-randomly chosen selection
of habituation and test trials presented non-sequentially (i.e.
habituation and test trials were interspersed). This naı¨ve observer
coded 20% of the data (half from the animate agent half from the
inanimate agent group) and the reliability between her scoring and
MC’s second scoring (used for analyses) was also high (Cronbach’s
alpha = 0.8).
A Chi-square test was used to compare groups on the number of
dogs that did not habituate. The mean looking time across the first
three and last three habituation-trials as well as across the new goal
and new side trials, was computed for each dog. A first
Generalized Estimated Equation (GEE) with Bonferroni corrected
posthoc comparisons was run with group (Animate vs. Inanimate),
test condition (new goal vs. new side trials) and test order (new goal
– new side vs. new side new goal) as independent variables and
mean looking time in each condition as dependent variable. Once
established that test order had no effect on on looking time in test
trials, we ran a full model testing our predictions and including sex
and object (globe vs. watering can) used during habituation as
potential confounding variables.
Hence a GEE (with Bonferroni corrected posthoc comparisons)
was run, with group (Animate vs. Inanimate), condition (first
habituation three, last habituation three, new goal, new side trials),
habituation object and sex as independent variables and mean
looking time across the three trials in each condition as dependent
variable. A final GEE (with Bonferroni corrected posthoc
comparisons) was run, with group (Animate vs. Inanimate) and
condition (habituation vs. new goal vs. new side trials) as
independent variables, but in this case the dogs’ looking time in
the extra habituation trial, first new goal and first new side test
trials was used.
Results
Four dogs did not complete the test because they became
distressed hiding under the owner’s chair becoming invisible to the
coder (1) or for procedural errors (3). A further dog was excluded
because the combination of black eyes and dark shaggy hair made
it impossible to discern her looking behaviour. Three dogs after
the second coding were found not to have habituated in the
number of habituation trials presented to them and hence had to
be removed.
The proportion of dogs that did not habituate and the number
of trials to habituation (for those who did habituate) did not differ
between groups (N. of dogs that did not habituate: 4/23 in the
Animate, none in the Inanimate X2 = 4, p = 0.07; Median number
of habituation trials for both groups was 9). The four dogs that did
not reach habituation were excluded from further analyses hence
the remaining group composition was as follows: 19 (13F, 6M;
mean age: 5.6, range: 1.5–10) in the Animate, 21 (10F, 11M; mean
age: 6.1, range: 1–11) in the Inanimate group. However, it is
important to note that results did not change when including the
four dogs that did not reach habituation.
The GEE assessing the potential effect of presentation order (i.e.
new side - new goal vs. new goal - new side) on subject’s looking
time in test trials, showed no main effect of presentation order
(Wald = 1.8, df = 1, p = 0.2) and no interaction between presenta-
tion order and neither condition (Wald = 0.9, df = 2, p = 0.6) nor
group (Wald = 5, df = 2, p = 0.075).
The GEE with the mean looking time across the first three and
last three habituation trials, the new side and new goal trials as
dependent variable, showed a significant group*condition inter-
action (Wald = 18.9, df = 3, p,0.001) and a main effect of
condition (205.2, df = 3, p,0.001). There was however no main
effect of group (Wald = 0.09, df = 1, p = 0.8), sex (Wald = 1.2,
df = 1, p = 0.3), or habituation object (Wald = 0.008, df = 1,
p = 0.9).
Figure 1. Photographic representation of the experimental
setup. A) In the habituation phase dogs in the animate group saw the
experimenter interacting repeatedly with one of two objects (in this
case the globe). After a subject-determined number of trials to reach
habituation, the dog was presented with B) 3 new-side trials (the
experimenter interacted with the same object placed in the new
location) followed by C) 3 repetitions of the new-goal trial (the
experimenter interacted with the novel object, the watering-can here,
placed in the old location).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0106530.g001
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There was no difference between groups in the time spent
looking at the scene in neither the first nor the last three
habituation-trials (mean first 3 habituation trials: Animate = 7,
Inanimate = 7.8, p = 1; mean last 3 habituation trials: Ani-
mate = 2.7, Inanimate = 3.1; p = 1).
In the Animate group, dogs spent significantly less time looking
at the scene in the last three compared to the first three
habituation trials (mean: first 3 habituation trials = 7, last 3
habituation trials = 2.7 p,0.001). Furthermore, dogs in this group
recovered from habituation (last three trials) in new goal trials
(mean: habituation = 2.7, new goal = 6.5, p,0.001) but not in new
side trials (mean: habituation = 2.7, new side = 4, p = 0.6). Finally,
dogs in this group looked at the interaction for significantly longer
in new-goal compared to new-side trials (mean: new-side = 3.9 vs.
new-goal = 6.5, p = 0.02).
In the Inanimate group, dogs also spent significantly less time
looking at the scene in the last three compared to the first three
habituation trials (mean: first 3 habituation trials = 7.8, last 3
habituation trials = 3.1 p,0.001). However, a reverse pattern
emerged with dogs recovering from habituation in new side trials
(mean: habituation = 3.1, new side = 5.6, p,0.01) but not in new
goal trials (mean: habituation = 3.1, new goal = 4.1, p = 1).
Furthermore, there was no significant difference in dogs’ looking
time in new side vs. new goal trials in this group (mean: new-
side = 5.6 vs. new-goal = 4.1, p = 0.19) (Figure 2).
The GEE with looking time in the extra habituation trial, 1st
new side and 1st new goal trial as dependant variable also revealed
a group*condition interaction (Wald = 8.9, df = 2, p = 0.01). There
was no difference between groups in the time spent looking at the
scene in the extra habituation trial (mean: animate = 2.6,
inanimate = 5.9; p = 0.2). In the animate group, dogs recovered
from habituation in the 1st new goal trial (mean: extra
habituation = 2.5, 1st new goal = 6.9, p = 0.009) but not in the 1st
new side trial (mean: extra habituation = 2.5, 1st new side = 5.9,
p = 0.2). There was however no difference between the 1st new
goal and 1st new side trial (mean: new-side = 5.9 vs. new-
goal = 6.9, p = 1). In the Inanimate group there was no recovery
from the extra habituation trial neither in the 1st new goal nor 1st
new side trial (mean: extra habituation = 5.9, 1st new side = 7,
p = 1; 1st new goal = 4.8, p = 1), nor was there a difference between
the latter test trials (P = 0.3).
As for the dogs’ choice of the object when they were allowed to
freely explore the room at the end of the test: 3 of the 19 dogs in
the Animate group approached the new goal object first, 2 the new
side, and 12 did not move from their owner’s side. Of the
remaining two dogs the object choice was lost due to video
malfunction. In the Inanimate group 4 of the 21 dogs in the
animate group approached the new goal object first, 3 the new
side, and 13 did not move from their owner’s side, and the
remaining dog went to explore the curtain before either of the
objects. Hence overall there was no difference in the approach
behaviour of dogs in the different conditions.
Discussion
Dogs readily habituated to the repeated presentation of the
actor/box interacting with one of the objects. Furthermore, the
habituation rate, proportion of dogs habituating and duration of
looking time in the latter three habituation trials was comparable
across groups, and comparable to results from the infant literature
(e.g. the average looking time in the last 3 habituation trials for
babies was approx. 3.1 seconds [7] and for dogs 2.9). Interestingly,
dogs showed a similar pattern of results to human infants and
marmosets, in that they looked significantly longer at the new goal
trials compared to the new side trials when the actor was an
animate agent but not when the agent-object interaction was
performed by an inanimate agent [7,9,19,20].
Figure 2. Dogs’ looking time.Mean looking time (and 95% confidence interval) across the first and last three habituation trials, new-side trials and
new-goal trials for dogs in the animate and inanimate group.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0106530.g002
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Indeed it seems that dogs, when seeing the inanimate agent
touch the objects, focused on the path taken by the black box, as
suggested by dogs’ recovery from habituation in in new-side trials
(when the path had changed) but not in new-goal trials. However,
when dogs saw a person interact with the object they showed a
tendency to look longer to a change in the object being
manipulated (new goal trials) than to a change in the path taken
by the actor (new side trials), suggesting that the dogs’ attention in
this case was on the actors’ goals, i.e. the object they interacted
with.
The first trial data comparing new-side to new-goal conditions
was not as clear-cut, since indeed no difference emerged between
conditions in the animate group, although recovery from
habituation did occur in the first new-goal (but not new side)
trial. One important aspect to note, is that the first trial of each
condition is to a certain extent novel, hence it is likely to increase
the subject’s looking time. In infant studies first trial data is not
reported [7,9], hence it is not easy to directly compare results from
this study with the pattern of looking in the infant literature.
Overall, whereas dogs’ looking time appeared comparable to that
of infants in the habituation phase, in test trials it was overall
shorter. Whether this is due to a lack of interest, or a species typical
pattern of looking is difficult to establish without studies directly
comparing the two species on multiple tasks.
Hence based on current results, and their similarity to the
pattern of results obtained in similar infants studies, it appears that
dogs interpreted the actor’s behavior towards the object as goal-
directed.
However, dogs have been shown to be neophilic, in that given a
choice between a familiar and a novel object they will prefer to
interact with the latter [45]; furthermore, in a Visual Paired
Comparison paradigm where old and new object are simulta-
neously presented on a screen, dogs looked preferentially at the
novel projected object [46]. Interestingly, novelty in the current
paradigm is designed to be present in both sets of test trials, the
new side and new goal trials. Indeed novelty was perceived
differently for the animate and inanimate agents: in fact dogs
looked longer at the person when she suddenly interacted with a
different object but did not show the same pattern of looking
behavior when the black box changed objects. This suggests that
dogs formed an expectation about the object directed goals of the
human, but not of the inanimate object. Results with the human as
the actor are further confirmed by a clear recovery in looking time
from the last three habituation trials to the new goal but not the
new-side trials, where an opposite pattern emerged with the
inanimate agent, where dog’s looking time recovered in new-side
but not new-goal trials. It is not altogether clear why dogs’ looking
time increased significantly in new-side trials when the inanimate
object was the actor; one possibility is that dogs formed an
expectation of the black box’s trajectory based on previous trials,
and hence showed a ‘surprise’ effect when the trajectory was
suddenly different. However, further testing will be required to
ascertain dogs’ expectations as regards inanimate agents.
One possible explanation for dogs’ increased looking time in
new-goal trials with the human agent, is that based on test trials
the dogs stopped expecting the experimenter to do something
interesting and relevant to them with the old object, but based on
previous experience with humans, they may still have expected
something interesting for them to occur (e.g. playing with it or
fetching a piece of food from it) when a new object was being
manipulated. This possibility cannot be excluded, however it is
perhaps interesting to note, that once the dogs were released very
few investigated the objects at all, suggesting that there was no
strong expectation of finding food. Furthermore, although the
dogs may have had expectations of what humans usually do when
interacting with an object in relation to themselves, in most cases
before something relevant to them occurs, communicative cues
such as using the dogs’ name or looking directly at it, are used to
engage the dogs’ attention. Indeed such cues have been shown to
be powerful attention getters in many studies [47,48]. However in
the current study no such cues were used, hence the actions may
have been more equated to a person’s interacting with everyday
object, actions largely irrelevant to dogs.
Representation of another’s actions as goal-directed has been
shown in a number of primate species [16–18,23,49], but this is
the first evidence, to our knowledge, of a similar phenomenon
being shown in a non-primate species. However, numerous studies
have shown dogs’ sensitivity to their human partner’s attentional
states, both in begging, play and communicative situations [50–
54], and growing evidence, using diverse experimental paradigms,
suggests that dogs have some basic understanding of human visual
perspective taking [55–57]. Finally, dogs have been shown to
imitate selectively, taking into account the contextual constraints of
the demonstrator [40] but see [41,42], which would also suggest
some understanding of their conspecific demonstrator’s goals.
Current results add to the evidence suggesting that dogs may
also have the ability to perceive human object-directed action as
goal-directed. However, this does not necessarily imply a
mentalistic understanding on the dog’s part. Indeed a number of
authors have suggested that an understanding of goal-directed
actions, even in infants, does not necessarily imply an under-
standing of mental states as representational. Some authors suggest
that infants at this stage may have a perception of simple internal
states but only referring to actual objects, rather than their
representation [58,59]; whereas other authors dismiss the looking
time studies arguing that such data only provide evidence for
infants abilities to form statistical associations during the course of
an experiment [60]. A third non-mentalisitic approach suggests
that prior to the emergence of a mentalistic interpretation of the
agent action relationship, infants may adopt a teleological stance
whereby through a process of inferential reasoning (the ‘rationality
principle’) as regards the actions (and their efficacy), the goal states
and the constraints in specific situations, an infant may be capable
of inferring the latter’s goals without appealing to ‘desires or
beliefs’ [2,61].
At present it is premature to reach conclusions as to the
underlying mechanisms driving dogs’ apparent perception of
human actions as goal-directed. Considering dogs have been
shown to apply ‘inferential reasoning’ in simple contexts [62,63],
and show sensitivity to situational constraints in a social learning
context [40–42], the rationality principle may be sufficient to
account for dogs’ attribution of goal-directed action to humans, at
this point in time. However, differently from studies carried out
with infants [5,64,65], a systematic investigation of this issue has
not as yet been carried out and would be necessary to ascertain the
validity of such an explanation. What is however important in the
current context is that the ‘Woodward paradigm’ has been shown
to be applicable to dogs, which opens up the possibility of further
investigating the underlying mechanisms of their understanding of
human actions as goal-directed, as well as how dogs perceive
gazing and pointing (as has been done with infants see [66,67]).
In conclusion, the current study suggests that a well-known and
accepted method of investigation used in the study of infants’
understanding of others’ goal-directed action can be successfully
employed with dogs. Dogs show a similar pattern of response to
that shown in infants and marmosets, with a clear recovery in
looking time when the animate (person) but not inanimate (black
box) agent unexpectedly shifts their action to a novel object. This
Dogs’ Understanding of Human Goal-Directed Action
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 6 September 2014 | Volume 9 | Issue 9 | e106530
suggests that dogs may view the actions of humans (but not of
black boxes) as goal-directed, although further studies are needed
to clarify whether this process is based on mentalistic processes or
inferential reasoning about the contingency of the situation.
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